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This paper studies a formalisation of intuitionistic logic by Negri and von
Plato which has general introduction and elimination rules. The philosophi-
cal importance of the system is expounded. Definitions of ‘maximal formula’,
‘segment’ and ‘maximal segment’ suitable to the system are formulated and
corresponding reduction procedures for maximal formulas and permutative
reduction procedures for maximal segments given. Alternatives to the main
method used are also considered. It is shown that deductions in the system
convert into normal form and that deductions in normal form have the
subformula property.
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1 Introduction
According to inferentialist semantics for the logical constants, the rules governing
such an expression define its meaning, if those rules satisfy certain criteria. The
view stems ultimately from Gentzen (1934, §5.13, 189) and has received profound
scrutiny and development in the hands of Dummett (1978; 1993), Prawitz (1965;
1971; 2006; 2007) and Schroeder-Heister (2018). There are intricate questions
regarding the precise nature of these criteria and which logics may or may not
fulfil them, for which I am here merely going to refer the reader to the quoted
literature and references therein.1 The purpose of the present paper is not to
contribute to their development or critique. In the light of its heritage and
the vast literature ensuing its conception, an author is justified in taking for
granted that inferentialist semantics for the logical constants is a topic worth
exploring without needing to establish its foundations from scratch. I will
here only rely on two aspects of the criteria that rules ought to satisfy that are
generally agreed upon: (a) that there must be a certain balance, called, following
Dummett, harmony, between the grounds for deriving a complex formula by
one of the introduction rules for its main operator and the consequences of
1For a brief overview with a focus on Dummett and Prawitz, see (Kürbis, 2015a).
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using such a formula as the major premise of an elimination rule; (b) that
deductions in a formalisation of logic in natural deduction ought to be subject to
a normalisation theorem which establishes that any formula that is the conclusion
of an introduction rule and major premise of an elimination rule (for its main
connective) may be removed from a deduction. (b) is generally regarded as a
necessary condition for (a). A little more precisely, a deduction is in normal form
if (i) it contains no maximal formula, that is a formula that is the conclusion of
an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule (for its main
connective); and (ii) no maximal segment, that is a sequence of formulas of the
same shape arising from the applications of certain rules the last of which is
major premise of an elimination rule.2 The normalisation theorem for a system
establishes that any deduction in it can be transformed into a deduction in
normal form. A deduction has the subformula property iff any formula that occurs
on it is a subformula of either an undischarged assumption or of the conclusion.
If deductions in normal form have the subformula property, then for every
deduction in the system, there is one with the subformula property. Details
and precise definitions to follow in due course. The present paper proves a
normalisation theorem for a system of intuitionistic logic by Negri and von Plato
(2001, 216f) that captures aspect (a) of inferentialist semantics for the logical
constants particularly neatly. It also satisfies aspect (b). Negri and von Plato
do not prove normalisation for their system directly, but observe that it follows
by translation into sequent calculus, a special case of a cut elimination theorem
proved for a system of multiple conclusion sequent calculus by restriction to
single conclusions, and translation back into natural deduction (Negri and von
Plato, 2001, 215). The subformula property follows therefrom. The contribution
of the present paper is to provide a direct proof of normalisation for their system,
which raises interesting issues and requires new techniques. Major consequences
of normalisation, such as the subformula property and consistency, are also
drawn.
Negri and von Plato’s system has some quite original features. The intro-
duction rules for a connective ∗ are formulated in terms of the discharge of
assumptions of the form A ∗ B, and every rule of the system is one that allows
the derivation of an arbitrary formula from side-deductions of that formula and
some further premises, as is the case with disjunction elimination in Gentzen’s
system. The difference between introduction and elimination rules lies in
whether a formula with the connective governed by the rules as main operator
is discharged above a side-deduction required for an application of the rule or
whether such a formula is a premise of the rule.
Deductions in Gentzen’s formalisation of intuitionistic logic in natural
2I will, as best as readability allows, distinguish occurrences of formulas in deductions from a
more abstract notion of formula that applies to formulas of the same shape or form, as it is customary
to say. The latter could also be referred to as formula types, the former as their tokens. For brevity,
by ‘formula’ I often mean an occurrence of a formula, but I will be explicit about the distinction
where this aids understanding. There are also schematic formulas and their instances, which may
or may not be formulas of the same shape, by which the general statement of a rule of inference is
distinguished from its application in a deduction: the former uses schematic formulas and specifies
the common form of all its instances, the latter have formula occurrences as their premises and
conclusions and are used in the construction of deductions. I will thus speak of rules as well as of
their applications, but for the sake of brevity by ‘rule’ I will often mean an application of a rule. This
clarification and the ensuing greater precision in the use of terminology was added at the request of
previous readers of this paper.
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deduction can be brought into normal form and these deductions have the
subformula property. This was shown by Prawitz (1965, Ch. IV).3 Normalisation
is a subtle process, and changing any rules in a system immediately raises the
question whether both properties still hold for deductions after the modification.
The present paper answers this question in the positive for Negri’s and von
Plato’s formalisation of intuitionistic logic. To do so it is necessary to adjust
the definition of ‘maximal formula’, ‘segment’ and ‘maximal segment’ given by
Prawitz, and accordingly to reformulate the reduction procedures to remove
maximal formulas and maximal segments from deductions. This is new to
the literature. The discussion in the main part of the paper is restricted to
propositional logic. The conclusion considers suitable rules for the universal
and existential quantifiers and equality, some of which are also new, and gives
reduction procedures for maximal formulas with these expressions as main
operators.
2 General Elimination and Introduction Rules: Philo-
sophical Considerations
Gentzen initially considers introduction and elimination rules for a primitive
negation operator (Gentzen, 1934, 186), but then observes that, as ¬A can be
defined as A ⊃ ⊥, they may be omitted (Gentzen, 1934, 189). The result is the
system studied by Prawitz (1965, Ch. IV):
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The elimination rules exhibit a certain discrepancy. The conclusions of applica-
tions of ∨E and ⊥E can be any formula, whereas the conclusions of ∧E and ⊃E
are subformulas of A ∧ B and A ⊃ B.
3Von Plato has edited previously unpublished material of Gentzen’s that shows that he had also
proved these results for intuitionistic logic. See (von Plato, 2008) and (von Plato, 2017). A referee
points out that Raggio published normalisation theorems for Gentzen’s systems around the same
time as Prawitz and remarked that ‘Gentzen has certainly had proofs’ (Raggio, 1965, 91) of these
results. Raggio’s proof uses an interesting technique different from the one by now well known
through the work of Prawitz. His normal form theorem is also a little different from Prawitz’s.
Raggio’s method removes all segments that end in the major premise of an elimination rule at
once, if all their first formulas are concluded by an introduction rule or ⊥E (not restricted to atomic
formulas).
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The elimination rules for ∨ and ⊥ do indeed belong in the same class:
applying ∨E requires two side-deductions, which also provide the conclusion
of the rule, in which assumptions are discharged that are proper subformulas of
the major premise A∨ B. ⊥ has no proper subformulas, and correspondingly its
elimination rule requires no side-deductions.4
The discrepancy is eradicated in systems of natural deduction with general
elimination rules (von Plato, 2001), which have alternative elimination rules for ∧











From now on, the labels ‘∧E’ and ‘⊃E’ refer to these two rules.
Harmony between the introduction and elimination rules governing a
logical constant ∗ consists in a certain balance between the grounds for deriving
a formula with ∗ as main operator as specified by its introduction rules and
the consequences that may be derived from such a formula as specified by
its elimination rules. Harmony has two aspects. One is that the grounds for
deriving A ∗ B as specified by ∗I are balanced by its consequences as specified by
∗E; the other that the consequences of A ∗ B as specified by ∗E are balanced by its
grounds as specified by ∗I.
Negri and von Plato explain that general elimination rules capture the
thought that everything that follows from the grounds for deriving a formula
A ∗ B follows from A ∗ B. They name the following principle after a comparable
one put forward by Prawitz (1965, 33f):
Inversion Principle: Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriving a proposi-
tion must follow from that proposition. (Negri and von Plato, 2001, 6ff)
In other words, all the consequences of the grounds of A ∗ B are consequences
of A ∗ B. Here the consequences of a proposition are consequences of that
proposition together with any minor premises, as in the case of ⊃E and ∨E.
General elimination rules thus capture one aspect of harmony. What about
the other aspect? We should expect it to be captured by a converse of this
inversion principle: everything that follows from A ∗ B follows from the direct
grounds for deriving A ∗ B; all the consequences of A ∗ B are consequences of the
grounds of A ∗ B. By analogy, this should be captured by the introduction rules
for ∗. But it is not immediate how Gentzen’s rules might do so.
It is, however, immediate for Negri’s and von Plato’s general introduction
rules (Negri and von Plato, 2001, 217), which have the rather original feature
that, instead of introducing formulas with a connective ∗ as main operator as


























From now on, the labels ∧I, ⊃I and ∨I refer to these rules. They conform exactly
to a converse of the inversion principle just quoted:
Converse Inversion Principle: Whatever follows from a proposition must follow
from the direct grounds for deriving that proposition.
Milne, another major figure in inferentialist semantics, concurs, albeit that he
prefers classical over intuitionistic logic (Milne, 2015): he, too, proposes general
introduction rules to capture harmony after having found the usual introduction
rules stemming from Gentzen wanting in the light of considerations regarding
the inversion principles.5
General introduction and elimination rules, Negri and von Plato point out,
exhibit a ‘perfect symmetry’, captured in the following principle:
General introduction rules state that if a formula C follows from a formula A, then it
already follows from the immediate grounds for A; general elimination rules state that if
C follows from the immediate grounds for A, then it already follows from A. (Negri
and von Plato, 2001, 217)
A system in which general elimination rules are paired with general introduction
rules thus has a good claim on capturing harmony and its converse, a requirement
Dummett calls stability (Dummett, 1993, Ch. 13). According to Dummett,
stability between introduction and elimination rules is a necessary condition
for those rules to define the meaning of the logical constant they govern. Negri
and von Plato’s system is thus of some philosophical importance: it arguably
captures stability between introduction and elimination rules more accurately
than Gentzen’s and Prawitz’s systems of intuitionistic logic and consequently the
systems around which inferentialist semantics has centred. Critics of harmony,
therefore, had better look at the present system.
Negri and von Plato’s system will be defined precisely in the next section.6
Gentzen’s introduction and elimination rules for intuitionistic logic are easily
derived from the general introduction and elimination rules (see below, p.12).
5Milne formalised a system of classical logic with general introduction and elimination rules
in which for every valid deduction, there is one with the subformula property (Milne, 2010). This
is rather unusual and a result of great importance. However, as my current purpose is not to
adjudicate between classical and intuitionistic logic, I set Milne’s system aside and focus on the
logic favoured by Dummett and Prawitz. Milne’s proof is model theoretic and not constructive.
I establish his result proof-theoretically and constructively by means of normalisation in (Kürbis,
2021), which can be read as a companion piece to the present paper. For the history of inversion
principles, see (Moriconi and Tesconi, 2008).
6It is an intuitionistic version of Parigot’s classical system of free deduction when written in
natural deduction style (Parigot, 1992). The latter is a system of multiple conclusion sequent calculus.
The present system results if Parigot’s pair of right conjunction rules are replaced by a single rule
variant, the primitive negation rules are replaced by a suitable rule for ⊥, the multiple conclusions
are restricted to single conclusions in the most obvious way, and the result is transposed to the
framework of natural deduction used here. This method is slightly simpler than the method by
which Parigot constructs a more familiar version of natural deduction in sequent calculus style for
classical logic from free deduction (Parigot, 1992, 368).
5
Conversely, the general introduction and elimination rules are easily derived
from Gentzen’s rules. Thus it is a formalisation of intuitionistic propositional
logic.
Remark 1. Primitive Negation. The following is a pair of general introduction and













A familiar introduction rule for negation is derivable from ¬I by letting C be ¬A
and Ξ empty, that is discharging ¬A straight after assuming it.
Notice that ¬E does indeed have the form of a general elimination rule. This
can be seen by returning to treating ¬A as A ⊃ ⊥ and replacing ⊥ for B in ⊃E.
As everything follows from ⊥, a side-deduction showing that the conclusion of
the application of the rule follows from ⊥ is redundant. Analogously, treating ¬
as primitive again, ¬E could be supplemented by a side-deduction of C from
two formulas B and ¬B, which is redundant for the same reason (make use
of the option of discharging only one assumption of the side-deduction and
chose it to be identical to the conclusion: this derives the rule ¬E above). These
rules, however, are less satisfactory than those for the other connectives, as
negation occurs in a premise of the introduction rule. This is often considered
to be a shortcoming if rules are intended to define the meaning of a connective
they govern, and for this reason it is preferable to define negation in terms of
implication and falsum.7
Remark 2. Verum. Dual to the falsum constant ⊥ is the verum constant >. Its





> has no elimination rule.
Remark 3. Classical Logic. Prawitz’s formalisation of classical logic consists of





where P is an atomic formula.
The presence of this rule necessitates a restriction of the subformula property of
deductions in normal form: allowance must be made for assumptions of the
7For reflections on whether the meaning of negation is adequately defined by its usual rules, see
(Kürbis, 2015b). For an approach that justifies the negation of minimal logic, see (Kürbis, 2019a).
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form ¬P that are discharged by classical reductio ad absurdum and formulas ⊥
concluded from them (Prawitz, 1965, 42). Siders and von Plato prove a similar
result for the full system of classical logic with general elimination rules (von
Plato and Siders, 2012).8
3 Intuitionistic Propositional Logic
This section contains a more precise characterisation of the system I of intu-
itionistic logic with general introduction and elimination rules.9 The following
section is the main section of this paper with the proof of the normalisation
theorem and its corollaries.
The definition of the language of I is standard.
Definition 1 (Connective, Atomic Formula, Degree of a Formula) ⊥,⊃,∧ and
∨ are the connectives. An atomic formula is one that contains no connective. The
degree of a formula is the number of connectives occurring in it.
⊥, being a connective, is not an atomic formula, but a formula of degree 1.
Deductions in I have the familiar tree shape, with the (discharged or undis-
charged) assumptions at the top-most nodes or leaves and the conclusion at the
bottom-most node or root. The conclusion of a deduction is said to depend on
the undischarged assumptions of the deduction. Similar terminology is applied
to subdeductions of deductions.
Assumptions are assigned assumption classes, (at most) one for each assump-
tion, marked by a natural number, different numbers for different assumption
classes. Formula occurrences of different types10 must belong to different as-
sumption classes. Formula occurrences of the same type may, but do not have
to, belong to the same assumption class. Discharge of assumptions is marked
by a square bracket around the formula: [A]i, i being the assumption class to
which A belongs, with the same label also occurring at the application of the
rule at which the assumption is discharged. Assumptions classes are chosen in
such a way that if one assumption of an assumption class is discharged by an
application of a rule, then it discharges all assumptions in that assumption class.
Empty assumption classes are permitted: they are used in vacuous discharge,
when a rule that allows for the discharge of assumptions is applied with no
assumptions being discharged.
Upper case Greek letters Σ, Π, Ξ, possibly with subscripts or superscripts,
denote deductions. Often some of the assumptions and the conclusion of the
deduction are mentioned explicitly at the top and bottom of Σ, Π, Ξ. Using the
same designation more than once to denote subdeductions of a deduction means
that these subdeductions are exact duplicates of each other apart from, possibly,
the labels of the assumption classes: the deductions have the same structure
and at every node formulas of the same type are premises and conclusions of
applications of the same rules.
8In Milne’s a system of classical logic, for every valid deduction, there is one with the unrestricted
subformula property. In the light of the necessity to restrict the subformula property in other
formulations of classical logic, this is a remarkable result, but, for reasons given in footnote 5, I will
not investigate it any further here.




Definition 2 (Deduction in I)
(i) The formula occurrence A is a deduction in I of A from the undischarged
assumption A.
(ii) If Σ, Π, Ξ are deductions in I, then following are deductions of C in I from
the undischarged assumptions in Σ, Π, Ξ apart from those in the assumption






























































(iii) Nothing else is a deduction in I.
We can suppress the label indicating the rule applied, but the labels indicating
discharge must always be present.
We may think of assumption classes as being assigned to formulas during the
course of the construction of a deduction to mark the discharge of assumptions.
Then the construction of deductions according to the definition leaves some
assumptions without assumption classes in the completed deduction. We
can assign them assumption classes afterwards. 11 To record from which
assumptions a conclusion has been derived, it then suffices to list the assumption
classes to which the undischarged assumptions of the deduction belong. This
will be a multiset. We can write Γ `I A if there is a deduction in I of (the formula
occurrence) A from (occurrences of) some of the formulas in Γ.12
The premise A of ⊃E and C in all three elimination rules are normally called
the minor premises, but in the current system it is useful to have terminology
that allows to distinguish them.
11Troestra and Schwichtenberg write that assumptions ‘are supposed to be labeled by markers’
(Troestra and Schwichtenberg, 2000, 36) for assumption classes. We cannot decide at the outset
which assumptions are discharged at which point during the construction of the deduction. But we
can decide which ones are discharged by which application of a rule. I am grateful to a referee for
pointing out errors in a previous attempt at defining deductions and consequence and suggestions
for how to rectify them. Notice that if assumption classes are assigned to undischarged assumptions
of completed deductions, then combining such deductions to form a new one requires deleting
those labels for assumption classes. Similarly, applying the reduction procedures of the next section
requires deleting square brackets enclosing discharged assumptions and their labels.
12Structural rules for ` follow: thinning by adding empty assumption classes of formulas, or
splitting one assumption class into two, if it concerns formulas of the same type, contraction by
relabelling two assumption classes with one of their labels.
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Definition 3 (Terminology for Premises and Discharged Assumptions)
(i) In applications of the elimination rules, formula occurrences taking the places
of A∧ B, A ⊃ B, A∨ B and ⊥ to the very left above the line are the major premises;
formula occurrences taking the places of C to their right are the arbitrary premises,
and a formula occurrence taking the place of A inbetween in an application of
⊃E is the minor premise.
(ii) In applications of the introduction rules, formula occurrences taking the
places of A and B to the very left above the line are the specific premises, and those
taking the place of C to their right are the arbitrary premises; formula occurrences
taking the places of the discharged assumptions A ⊃ B, A ∨ B and A ∧ B are the
major assumptions discharged by applications of the respective rules, and those
taking the place of the discharged assumptions A in ⊃I are the minor assumptions
discharged by applications of that rule.
Vacuous discharge happens when no assumption is discharged above an
arbitrary premise or above the specific premise of ⊃I. The latter is sometimes
necessary, but the former is always superfluous: Instead of applying the rule,
we might as well go on with the deduction straight from the arbitrary premise.
In ∧E, it is of course often necessary to make use of the option of discharging
only one assumption.
Applications of rules with vacuous discharge above arbitrary premises can
be removed from deductions by what is often called simplification conversions.13
As these procedures are obvious, I will give no details here. In the following,
I will assume that any deduction is cleaned up so as to contain no vacuous
discharge above arbitrary premises: vacuous discharge above arbitrary premises
is banned. In particular, I will assume that this is done should vacuous discharge
above an arbitrary premise arise as a result of the conversions of deductions
that remove maximal formulas, to be given in the next section.14
⊥E can be restricted to atomic conclusions. The proof is by an induction over
the degree of formulas and the following transformations, replacing the steps to
the left of{ by those to its right:
⊥








A ∨ B {
⊥




A ⊃ B {
⊥
B [A ⊃ B]1
⊃I 1
A ⊃ B
Obviously a step that concludes ⊥ from ⊥ by ⊥E is superfluous. From now on
it is assumed that any application of ⊥E has an atomic conclusion.
13See, e.g., (Troestra and Schwichtenberg, 2000, 181).
14It is worth remarking that this cannot happen in Milne’s formalisation of classical logic, where
vacuous discharged may be banned altogether.
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4 Normalisation for I
We begin by defining the notion of a maximal formula in a way that is suitable
for the rules of the system I:
Definition 4 (Maximal Formula) A maximal formula with main operator ∗ in a
deduction in I is an occurrence of a formula A ∗ B that is the major premise of an
application of ∗E and the major assumption discharged by an application of ∗I.
Reduction Procedures for Maximal Formulas
Maximal formulas are removed from deductions by applying the following
reduction procedures for maximal formulas, where Π,Σ above [A], [B] indicate
that these deductions are used to conclude each formula occurrence in the
assumption class to which A,B belong (assumption class markers and square
brackets are deleted). I will call the deduction to which a reduction procedure is
applied the initial deduction and the result of the conversion the reduced deduction.
1. The maximal formula has the form A ∧ B. Convert the deduction on the left






























If assumption class k contains only one formula (that is, the maximal formula
removed by the procedure), then the final step by ∧I in the deduction to the
right is omitted: in this case, the reduction procedure consists in replacing the
deduction on the left only by the deduction that concludes D by Π2 from Σ1,Σ2
through Π1 (that is, by the subdeduction concluding the arbitrary premise of
∧I on the right). The purpose of the final application of ∧I in the reduced
deduction is to ensure that any other formulas in assumption class k remain
discharged after the application of the reduction procedure. If only the displayed
maximal formula is in k, this purpose is not fulfilled and the application of
∧I introduces vacuous discharge; hence we omit it. Notice that applying the
reduction procedure cannot introduce any new maximal formulas into the
deduction. It can only introduce new maximal segments. More on this below,
before the proof of the normalisation theorem.15
15A suggestion by a referee lead to an improvement in the description of the reduction procedure.
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2. The maximal formula has the form A ⊃ B. Convert the deduction on the left




























As in the previous case, if assumption class k contains only one formula (that is,
the maximal formula removed by the procedure), then the final step by ⊃I in
the deduction to the right is omitted. Furthermore, in case ⊃I was applied with
vacuous discharge above its specific premise, the conversion may introduce
applications of rules with vacuous discharge above arbitrary premises. This
happens if an assumption in Π1 is discharged above an arbitrary premise of
a rule in Π3. It is assumed that these are removed as part of the reduction
procedure. Notice that applying this reduction procedure, too, cannot introduce
any new maximal formulas into the deduction, and can only introduce new
maximal segments.
3. The maximal formula has the form A ∨ B. Convert the deduction on the left



























As in the two previous case, if assumption class k contains only one formula (that
is, the maximal formula removed by the procedure), then the final step by ∨I in
the deduction to the right is omitted, and applying this reduction procedure,
too, cannot introduce any new maximal formulas into the deduction and can
only introduce new maximal segments. Similarly for the case where the specific
premise of ∨I is B concluded by Σ2.
This completes the reduction procedures for maximal formulas.
Alternative Procedures
It is worth mentioning some other ways of dealing with the fact that the
application of ∗I that gives rise to maximal formulas A ∗ B may discharge more
formulas than the maximal formulas above the arbitrary premise D in the
deductions marked by Π1,Π2,Π3. The following gives three alternatives, each
of which avoids the final step by ∗I to discharge those open assumptions in the
reduced deduction.
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I. One alternative would be to add deductions of A ∗ B wherever there is such
an assumption, using Σ1,Σ2 to conclude the specific premises of ∗I. These
deductions also demonstrate how to derive the usual introduction rules for













A [A ∨ B]i
i
A ∨ B
Doing so only generates new maximal formulas in case A ∗ B was a maximal
formula in the initial deduction and thus does not increase the number of
maximal formulas in the reduced deduction.
II. A second solution employs the fact that applications of introduction rules
may be restricted to discharge only one occurrence of a formula. Suppose, for
instance, one wanted to discharge n formula occurrences of the type A ∨ B by
an application of ∨I:
Σ
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The cases for the other connectives are similar. There are two options for
implementing this strategy: the restriction may be made either as part of the
construction of deductions, or any deduction to be normalised is first transformed
into one that satisfies the restriction before the reduction procedures are applied.
Either option works, as the system with the unrestricted introduction rules and
the system with their restricted versions are evidently equivalent. Obviously
any application of a restricted introduction rule is also a correct application of
the unrestricted version, and the converse holds in virtue of the following:
Proposition. Any deduction can be transformed into one in which every appli-
cation of a general introduction rule discharges exactly one major assumption.
Proof. By the ban on vacuous discharge above arbitrary premises, the trans-
formations indicated above and an induction over a suitable measure of the
12
complexity of deductions, e.g. the number of applications of introduction rules
discharging multiple formula occurrences of highest degree in a deduction.
Take such an application such that no other such application stands above it in
the deduction. Applying the transformation reduces the measure.
In the light of this proposition one could implement what may be called the unique
discharge convention on introduction rules: every application of an introduction
rule for ∗ discharges exactly one formula occurrence of the form A ∗ B. This has
some advantages. The conclusion of an application of an introduction rule in
Gentzen’s system obviously occurs exactly once in a deduction, so if the unique
discharge convention is upheld, there is a straightforward correspondence
between deductions in Gentzen’s system with the general elimination rule for
⊃ and in the present system with general introduction rules.16 However, it
also has disadvantages, as it is fair to say that upholding the unique discharge
assumption destroys the most striking features of general introduction rules.
Be that as it may, any sequence of applications of introduction rules as in
the example above can be collapsed into one application, so one could, after
maximal formulas have been removed from a deduction satisfying the unique
discharge convention, also simplify it again in that respect, thereby restoring
the characteristic and original features of general introduction rules.
III. The third, and most interesting, alternative strategy is based on the observa-
tion that if an application of ∗I gives rise to more than one maximal formula, then
they may all be removed at once by a reduction procedure which simultaneously
concludes formulas of the form A ∗ B discharged by ∗I that are not maximal by
the deductions given in the first alternative strategy.
1. The maximal formula has the form A ∧ B. Convert the deduction on the left
























where if there is only one formula in assumption class k, then Π∗1 = Π1 and




2 are obtained from
Π1,Π2 in the following way:
(a) for formulas A ∧ B in assumption class k that are maximal: delete the
application of ∧E that has the formula as major premise as in the pattern
displayed above, by moving directly from the rule that concludes its arbitrary
premise to the rule applied to its conclusion and concluding all assumptions A,
B discharged by this rule by Σ1,Σ2.
16It is for this reason that the unique discharge convention is appealed to in (Kürbis, 2021): it
permits an easy transposition of Milne’s system into a more standard system of classical logic with
the subformula property. The alternative reduction procedures for removing maximal formulas
from deductions in I used here could also be adapted to Milne’s system.
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(b) for formulas A ∧ B in assumption class k that are not maximal: conclude
them by the derivation of the first strategy displayed on p.12 using Σ1,Σ2.
Notice that, as in our ‘official’ reduction procedure for maximal formulas of
the form A ∧ B, applying the alternative procedure cannot introduce any new
maximal formulas into the deduction. It may introduce new maximal segments,
but the comments to be made in due course on this possibility in relation to the
official procedure apply here, too.
2. The maximal formula has the form A ⊃ B. Convert the deduction on the left




























3 are analogous to the previous case: if k contains only one
formula, they are identical to Π1,Π2,Π3, otherwise they are obtained by deleting
applications of ⊃I discharging maximal formulas in k, concluding assumptions
B becoming undischarged by Π1, Σ1 as in the pattern displayed, and concluding
all others by the relevant deduction of the first strategy. Further comments on
vacuous discharge and new maximal formulas and segments apply as usual.
3. The maximal formula has the form A ∨ B. Convert the deduction on the left

























3 constructed analogously to the previous cases. Further comments
apply here, too. Similarly for the case where the premise of ∨I is B concluded
by Σ2.
This completes the discussion of alternatives.
Applications of general introduction and elimination rules require deductions of
arbitrary premises C which also provide the conclusion of the application of the
rule. They form part of sequences of formula occurrences of the same shape17:
17See footnote 1.
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Definition 5 (Segment) A segment is a sequence of formula occurrences C1 . . .Cn
of the same shape in a deduction such that n > 1, for all i < n, Ci is an arbitrary
premise of an application of a rule and Ci+1 is its conclusion, and Cn is not an
arbitrary premise of an application of a rule.
The length of a segment is the number of formula occurrences of which it consists,
its degree the degree of any such formula. As C1 . . .Cn are all of the same shape,
I will speak of the formula (as a type) constituting the segment.
Observation. A consequence of the ban on vacuous discharge above arbitrary
premises is that the first formula of a segment is an arbitrary premise discharged
by an introduction rule, the conclusion of which is the second formula of the
segment. The major, minor and specific premises of rules are either assumptions
or the last formulas of segments.
Definition 6 (Maximal Segment) A maximal segment is a segment the last for-
mula of which is the major premise of an elimination rule.
Maximal segments are removed from deductions by permutative reduction proce-
dures. Of these there are 24 in total, as the major premises of ⊃E, ∨E, ∧E and
⊥E can be derived by six rules (i.e. as the conclusions of the introduction and
elimination rules for ⊃, ∨ and ∧). I will only give some of the cases for ⊃E and
⊥E as examples, the others being similar.
1. The major premise of ⊃E is derived by ∨I. Convert the deduction on the left



























2. The major premise of ⊃E is derived by ⊃I. Convert the deduction on the left
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3. The major premise of ⊃E is derived by ∧E. Convert the deduction on the left




























4. The major premise of ⊥E has been derived by ∧I. Convert the deduction on





















5. The major premise of ⊥E has been derived by ∨E. Convert the deduction on






















The other 19 permutative reduction procedures pose no further complications.
Definition 7 (Normal Form) A deduction is in normal form if it contains neither
maximal formulas nor maximal segments.
Repeated application of a permutative reduction procedure reduces the length
of a maximal segment by permuting applications of elimination rules upwards
in the deduction. As observed earlier, the first formula of a segment can only
be one discharged by an introduction rule, and so repeated application of a
permutative reduction procedure turns a maximal segment into a maximal
formula. At the top of every maximal segment, there stands a maximal formula,
so to speak.
Definition 8 (Rank of Deductions) The rank of a deduction Π is the pair 〈d, l〉,
where d is the highest degree of a maximal formula or maximal segment in Π or
0 if there is none, and l is the sum of the sum of the lengths of maximal segments
of highest degree and the number of maximal formulas in Π. 〈d, l〉 < 〈d′, l′〉 iff
either (i) d < d′ or (ii) d = d′ and l < l′.
Applying reduction procedures for maximal formulas cannot introduce new
maximal formulas into the reduced deduction, but it may increase the lengths of
maximal segments that were in the initial deduction.18 In the case of maximal
formulas of form A ∧ B, this can happen if Σ1 concludes A or Σ2 concludes
B with an elimination rule and some formula occurrence in the assumption
class to which the formulas discharged by ∧E belong is the major premise of
an elimination rule in Π1. In the case of maximal formulas of the form A ⊃ B,
this can happen if Σ1 concludes B with an elimination rule and some formula
occurrence in the assumption class to which the formulas discharged by ⊃E
belong is the major premise of an elimination rule in Π2, or if Π1 concludes A
with an elimination rule and some formula occurrence in the assumption class
to which the minor assumptions discharged by ⊃I belong is the major premise
of an elimination rule in Σ1. Similarly for maximal formulas of the form A ∨ B.
18The alternative reduction procedures may, incidentally, shorten maximal segments, namely if C
or D form part of one.
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Any maximal segment that suffers an increase in length as a result of a
reduction procedure is, however, of lower degree than the maximal formula
removed, as the formulas that constitute the segment are subformulas of the
latter. Hence applying a reduction procedure for maximal formulas cannot
increase the rank of a deduction.
Applying a permutative reduction procedures cannot introduce new maximal
segments into the reduced deduction, but it may increase the lengths of maximal
segments that were in the initial deduction. In examples 1.-3. above, this would
happen if E is part of a maximal segment.19 To ensure all maximal segments
are removed from a deduction, the permutative reduction procedures must be
applied with a strategy.
Say that a deduction that already is in normal form can be converted into
itself. Then we have the following:
Theorem 1 Any deduction in I can be converted into a deduction in normal form.
Proof. The theorem follows by the considerations of the paragraphs immediately
preceding the theorem and an induction over the rank of deductions. Applying
reduction procedures for maximal formulas cannot increase the rank of a
deduction, and as a maximal formula is removed, applying a reduction procedure
to a maximal formula of highest degree decreases the rank of the deduction.
Permutative reduction procedures must be applied so as to avoid an increase of
the lengths of segments of highest degree. This can be achieved by applying
one to a maximal segment of highest degree such that no maximal segment of
highest degree stands above it in the deduction. This reduces the rank of the
deduction.
Corollary 1 If Γ `I A, then there is a deduction in normal form with an occurrence of
A as the conclusion and occurrences of some of the formulas in Γ as the undischarged
assumptions.
Proof. Immediate from theorem 1.
If there is a deduction of C from assumptions A1 . . .An, then the deduction in
normal form into which it converts may retain only some of these assumptions:
applying the reduction procedures for maximal formulas of the form A ⊃ B
removes the deduction of the minor premises of ⊃E, if ⊃I discharges vacuously
above the specific premise.20
Theorem 2 If Π is a deduction in normal form, then all major premises of elimination
rules are (discharged or undischarged) assumptions of Π.
Proof. By the form of deductions in normal form, as a result of the permutative
reduction procedures.
Definition 9 (Branch) A branch in a deduction is a sequence of formula occur-
rences σ1 . . . σn such that σ1 is an assumption of the deduction that is neither
discharged by an elimination rule nor the major assumption discharged by
an introduction rule, σn is either the conclusion of the deduction or the minor
19It cannot happen in examples 4. and 5., as ⊥E is restricted to atomic conclusions.
20In Milne’s classical system, the deduction in normal form proceeds from the same assumptions.
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premise of ⊃E, and for each n > i: if σi is the major premise of an elimination
rule other than ⊥E, σi+1 is an assumption discharged by it, and if it is the major
premise of ⊥E, σi+1 is the conclusion of the rule; if σi is the specific premise of
an introduction rule, σi+1 is a major assumption discharged by it; and if σi is
an arbitrary premise (of an introduction or an elimination rule rule), σi+1 is the
conclusion of the rule.
Branches begin with a formula occurrence that is either an undischarged
assumption of the deduction or a minor assumption discharged by ⊃I. Taking
the formulas on a branch that form segments as units, we can also say that a
branch consists of a sequence of formulas or segments.
Corollary 2 If any major premises of elimination rules are on a branch in a deduction
in normal form, then they precede any major assumptions discharged by introduction
rules that are on the branch.
Proof. By theorem 2, the major premises of elimination rules that occur on a
branch in a deduction in normal form are assumptions. Hence they are not the
last formulas of any segments, and in particular they are not the last formulas
of any segments beginning with discharged major assumptions of introduction
rules.
It is a consequence of theorem 2 that in a deduction in normal form the major
premises of elimination rules do not form parts of segments. A branch in a
deduction in normal form typically begins with a sequence of major premises of
elimination rules, such that the conclusion of the last of them is either the first
formula on a segment ending in the specific premise of an introduction rule (if it
is⊥E) or the second formula of such a segment (in all other cases), and continues
with a sequence of segments the first formulas of which are major assumptions
discharged by introduction rules. The first half of the branch is called the E-part,
its second half the I-part. Separating them is the minimal formula or minimal
segment. It is the first formula or the first segment the last formula of which is the
specific premise of an introduction rule. If the last application of an elimination
rule is ⊥E, there is a minimal formula and it is ⊥. If the last application is any
other elimination rule, there is a minimal segment. Either part may be empty:
some branches in normal deductions consist of only an E-part, some of only an
I-part, and in the case of a deduction that consists of a single formula A, both
parts are empty and there is only a minimal formula. Inspection of the rules
shows that all formulas on the E-part are subformulas of the previous one, and
all formulas of the I-part are subformulas of the subsequent one.
Definition 10 (Order of Branches) A branch has order 0 if its last formula is
the conclusion of the deduction; it has order n + 1 if its last formula is the minor
premise of an application of ⊃E the major premise of which is on a branch of
order n.
A branch of order 0 is also called a main branch in the deduction.
Definition 11 (Subformula Property) A deduction Π of a conclusion C from
the undischarged assumptions A1 . . .An has the subformula property if every
formula on the deduction is a subformula either of C or of A1 . . .An.
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For brevity we may speak of a segment being the premise, conclusion or
discharged assumption of a rule if its last or first formula is the premise,
conclusion or discharged assumption of that rule.
Theorem 3 Deductions in normal form have the subformula property.
Proof. By inspection of the rules and an induction over the order of branches.
Consider a branch of order 0. The branch begins with a (possibly empty)
sequence of major premises of elimination rules, going from major premise
to assumption discharged by the elimination rule, until it reaches a specific
premise of an introduction rule, and then continues with segments discharged
by introduction rules, until it reaches the conclusion of the deduction. All
formulas on the latter part of the branch are subformulas of the conclusion of
the deduction. All formulas on the former part of the branch are subformulas
either of an assumption that remains undischarged in the deduction, in which
case they are subformulas of a formula that is an undischarged assumption of
the deduction, or they are subformulas of a formula discharged by ⊃I, in which
case they are subformulas of a subformula of the conclusion. A branch that ends
in the minor premise of ⊃E ends in a formula that is a subformula of a branch of
lower order, and hence the theorem holds by induction.
Corollary 3 For any deduction in I, there is a deduction of the same conclusion from
some of its undischarged assumptions with the subformula property.
Proof. By theorems 1 and 3.
Finally, let a proof be a deduction of I that has no undischarged assumptions.
Elimination rules do not discharge assumptions above their major premises.
Hence if in a deduction in normal form there is a main branch that does not have
an I-part, it is not a proof. Contraposing and applying theorem 1 establishes:
Corollary 4 If there is a proof of A in I, then there is one that ends with an application
of an introduction rule.
The usual further corollaries follow. For instance, I has the disjunction property:
if `I A ∨ B, then either `I A or `I B.
Corollary 5 I is consistent.
Proof. Suppose there is a proof of⊥ in I. Then by corollary 4, there is a proof of⊥
that ends with an application of an introduction rule. But ⊥ has no introduction
rule. Hence there is no proof of ⊥.
5 Conclusion
Negri and von Plato only formulate general elimination rules for the quantifiers
(Negri and von Plato, 2001, 64), but not general introduction rules. They also
do not give rules for equality. To close this paper, I will briefly consider the
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formalisation of a full system of intuitionistic predicate logic with equality with
general introduction and elimination rules.21
The language has two disjoint sets of variables, the parameters a, b, c . . .playing
the role of free variables, and the variables to be bound by the quantifiers x, y, z . . .,
which do not occur free in formulas. The terms of the language are built up
from the parameters, constant symbols and function symbols in the usual way.
An expressions that is like a formula or a term, but containing free variables
instead of parameters, is often called a pseudo-formula or a pseudo-term.
Axt is the result of substituting all occurrences of the variable x in A by the
term t.22 Ξat is the result of substituting the term t for the parameter a throughout
deduction Ξ.
The elimination rule for the existential quantifier already has the form
of general elimination rules. The general elimination rule for the universal
















where in ∃E, the parameter a does not occur in ∃xA, nor in C, nor in any formulas
undischarged in Π except those of the assumption class [Axa].















where in ∀I, the parameter a does not occur in undischarged assumptions of Π.
Deductions in the system of intuitionistic predicate logic are defined by
adding clauses for these four rules to the inductive step of definition 2.
It is worth remarking that the rules for both quantifiers have the same form
and differ only with respect to the occurrences of terms and parameters and
consequently where restrictions on parameters are imposed.
The major premise of an application of ∃E,∀E is, as before, its leftmost
premise, the other being its arbitrary premise. Similarly for the specific and
arbitrary premises of ∃I,∀I. The major assumptions discharged by their appli-
cations are the formulas taking the places of ∃xA and ∀xA, respectively. The
definition of ‘maximal formula’ is as before, as is that of ‘maximal segment’,
except that segments now of course also arise by applications of the rules for
the quantifiers in the evident way.
As we have an unlimited amount of parameters at our disposal, we may
adopt the convention that every application of ∃E and ∀I has its own parameter,
21The rules for ∃ and = of this section are also found in (Milne, 2015). In (Kürbis, 2021) it is shown
that deductions in normal form in Milne’s system of classical predicate logic with ∃, but not with ∀,
satisfy the subformula property.
22If t is a pseudo-term, it is assumed that none of its free variables gets bound by the substitution,
i.e. that t is free for x in A. But notice that, if the result of the substitution is to be a formula rather
than a pseudo-formula, as is the case in the use made of this notation in rules of inference, we need
not consider this possibility: we only need to consider terms, not pseudo-terms. Analogously for
the next kind of substitution.
20
so that the parameter of an application of ∀I only occurs in its specific premise
and the formulas from which it is derived, and the parameter of an application
of ∃E occurs only in the formulas in the assumption class discharged by it and
formulas derived from them. Consequently, the parameter occurs only above
the application of the rule in a deduction, and any application of ∃E or ∀I below
it has a different parameter. Call this the parameter convention.
Inspection of the reduction procedures for the propositional connectives
shows that, if the parameter convention is upheld, then any correct application
of ∃E or ∀I in the initial deduction remains correct in the reduced deduction.
The following are the reduction procedures for maximal formulas of the
form ∃xA and ∀xA, continuing the numbering of those for propositional logic:
4. The maximal formula has the form ∃xA. Convert the deduction on the left
























where the procedure is again as in the cases of the propositional connectives: if
assumption class k contains only one formula, the final step by ∃I is omitted. By
the parameter convention, in the initial deduction a occurs only in Ξ, and hence
after its replacement by t it disappears altogether from the reduced deduction,
which therefore is a correct deduction.
5. The maximal formula has the form ∀xA. Convert the deduction on the left

























where the procedure is again as in the cases of the propositional connectives: if
assumption class k contains only one formula, the final step by ∀E is omitted.
By the parameter convention, in the initial deduction a occurs only in Ξ, and, as
it is no longer present in Ξat upon replacement by t, this is the only place where
it remains in the reduced deduction, which therefore is a correct deduction.
The additional permutative reduction procedures for maximal segments pose
no further problems, and I will not give them.
The results of the previous section go through as before, if substitution
instances of formulas of the form ∀xA and ∃xA are counted amongst their
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subformulas. Corollary 4 for intuitionistic predicate logic is used to prove the
existence property: if there is a proof of ∃xA, then, for some term t, there is a
proof of Axt .
Finally, what would general introduction and elimination rules for equality
be? Equality raises a number of philosophical questions, not the least, in the
present context, whether it is a logical constant the meaning of which may be
defined by the rules of inference governing it. I will not try to answer this
question here, but the second set of rules to be given, which effectively capture
Leibniz’ definition of equality, do, it seems to me, have a fair claim on satisfying
the criteria of inferentialist semantics.23











where P is atomic. The general case follows by induction. To exclude trivial
applications of =E, we may require t1 and t2 to be different.
One option of a general introduction rule for equality follows the pattern of
the rule for > considered in Remark 2 of section 2. An assumption of the form






The ban on vacuous discharge prevents futile applications of this rule with no
further effect than to deduce formulas from themselves.
The major premise of =E is t1 = t2, its minor premise is Pxt1 , the major
assumption discharged by =I is t = t, and in both rules C is the arbitrary premise.
Deductions in intuitionistic predicate logic with equality are defined by
extending the inductive step of the definition of deductions in intuitionistic
predicate logic by clauses for these two rules.
The additional permutative reduction procedures for these rules follow
the usual pattern. If the requirement of the difference of t1 and t2 in =E is
imposed, there are no maximal formulas of the form t1 = t2. Otherwise the
reduction procedure is straightforward and also follows a by now familiar
pattern. Replace the deduction on the left by the deduction on the right, where



















23For an in depth discussion of equality in inferentialist semantics, a survey of existing proposals
and a novel approach, see (Indrzejczak, 2021).
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As P is atomic, the reduction procedure cannot introduce new maximal formulas
into the reduced deduction.
A slightly more original option for a general introduction rule for equality
results by modifying a rule proposed by Read to fit the present framework.
Read observes that, if we add predicate parameters to the language, then t1 = t2
may be inferred if there is a deduction of Fxt2 from F
x
t1 in which F is a predicate
parameter not occurring in any undischarged assumptions except Fxt1 , and
conversely, a deduction of Fxt1 from F
x
t2 in which F is a predicate parameter not
occurring in any undischarged assumptions except Fxt2 (Read, 2004, 116). This
captures one half of Leibniz’ definition of t1 = t2 as ∀F(Fxt1 ≡ F
x
t2 ) in inferentialist














where the predicate parameter F does not occur in any formulas undischarged
in Π and Σ except in those of the assumption classes [Fxt2 ] and [F
x
t1 ].
The major assumption discharged by this rule is t1 = t2. Suitable terminology
for formulas in assumption classes [Fxt1 ] and [F
x
t2 ] would be the parametric
assumptions discharged by =I′. Its specific premises are the conclusions Fxt1 and
Fxt2 of Π and Σ. C is the arbitrary premise.
Considerations of harmony should then lead us to adding a second elimina-











where P is atomic. Together =E and =ES capture the other half of Leibniz’
definition of equality in inferential terms.
It would be possible to dispense with one of the deductions Π and Σ in
=I′: given, say, Σ, replacing Fx by x = t1, which is possible if F is a parameter
satisfying the conditions of an application of =I′, gives a deduction of t2 = t1
from t1 = t1; the latter is provable by a single application of =I′ using Fxt1 as both
premises and discharged assumptions; applying =E to the thus concluded t1 = t2
with Fxt2 as minor premise and F
x
t1 as arbitrary premise, discharged assumption
and conclusion yields the deduction of Fxt1 from F
x
t2 required for an application
of =I′. If this is done, harmony demands that the introduction rule for equality
should be paired with only one elimination rule; dispensing with Π, this should
be =E, =ES being derivable from the symmetry of equality, which in turn is
derivable from =E and the reflexivity of equality. For philosophical reasons,
however, it may be preferable to leave = I′ as it is: the single deduction is
sufficient only in the presence of =E, and so =I′ could not be said to define
23
the meaning of =, while its elimination rule merely exploits this meaning as so
defined according to the inversion principle.24
If deductions in intuitionistic predicate logic with equality are defined by =I′
instead of =I in the inductive step, then the reduction procedure for maximal
formulas of the form t1 = t2 is less trivial. We may assume that a corresponding
version of the parameter convention is upheld for predicate parameters with
respect to applications of =I′. Transform the deduction on the left into the
deduction on the right, where ΣFP is the result of substituting the predicate
parameter F by P throughout Σ, and as always, the final step by =I′ is omitted if









































By the parameter convention for predicate letters, F occurs only in Π and Σ,
from which it disappears after replacement by P, so the reduced deduction is a
correct deduction. P being atomic, the reduction procedure does not introduce
new maximal formulas into the deduction. In case the maximal formula arises
from an application of =ES, Pxt1 and P
x
t2 are interchanged, and the reduction
procedure replaces F by P in Π instead of in Σ.
Permutative reduction procedures pose once more no further problems.
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